There is No Such Thing as a Social Science

Since Peter Winch's death in 1997 there has been a revival of interest in his work. However, this book contends that Winch has been misrepresented in both the recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Reestablishing a Winchian voice, the authors argue that such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues which occupied him in his "Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy" and in his later papers remain central to social studies.A careful reading of crucial parts of the text is offered in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights, alongside a focus on the key question of the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. Drawing parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably Ethnomethodology, "There is No Such Thing as a Social Science" contends that social studies as a discipline has yet to rise to the challenges posed by Winch, demonstrating that Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined.