Problems in Historical Epistemology

It was only after I had finished this volume that I came across the book by Barry Bames, Scientific Knowledge and Sociologi cal Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul). I am in full ag,reement with certain ideas expounded in that book, although it also contains others that I must object to. I have decided to make some remarks about them at the beginning of my book, as I believe that they may prove useful by way of int,roduction to the English version of this volume. I hope that anyone who has professional reasons to turn his attention to this volume will have acquainted himself with Scientific Knowledge and Socio logical Theory before he proceeds any further. I fully share Barnes' view that it is possible and desirable to undertake descrtptive-sociological investigations of scientific research. The main subjeot of this research should be the na tural science, and ,moreover, such findings in these sciences whose cognitive value has never been questioned by profession als. These investigations must avoid becoming entangled in epistemologtical controversies, and through epi:stemo}. ogy in ,phi losophical controversies. They must not defend any of the contended theses and must not Hrterally ,rely on evaluative pre mises that have been questicmed.